A few blogs over the weekend by Stephen Kirchner and Calculated Risk about the US current account deficit set me thinking. A common view, well illustrated by The Overstretch Myth by David H Levy and Stuart S Brown in the March/April 2005 issue of Foreign Affairs, just published online, is that we should not be alarmed. (Thanks to Stephen for the link). Here is their key argument:
The United States' current account deficit and foreign debt are not dire threats to its global position, as would-be Cassandras warn. U.S. power is firmly grounded on economic superiority and financial stability that will not end soon. ...The biggest threat to U.S. hegemony, accordingly, stems not from the sentiments of foreign investors, but from protectionism and isolationism at home.
Hmmm. I agree that current account deficits in themselves are not necessarily a bad thing - indeed, they are often the result of robust economic growth. It is their sustainability that matters.
But when I read phrases like "economic superiority" I reach for the bucket... tell that to the Irish, British, Australians, New Zealanders and others who all managed to avoid a recession after the stock market bubble burst!
A less hubristic point of view was put recently by Australian Treasury economists in their Winter 2004 Economic Roundup article. David Gruen and Jason Harris ask: Might the United States continue to run large current account deficits? They agree that "the United States could perhaps continue to run sizeable current account deficits for many years with no obvious harmful side-effects". But there is a catch: "provided the United States fiscal deficit is significantly reduced (or eliminated)."
Continued large fiscal deficits seem to pose a much more serious risk to the United States outlook than continued large current account deficits on their own. If government debt continues to rise inexorably, with no convincing signs that it will be brought under control, it makes sense for investors to demand a rising risk premium — or at some point, to rush for the exits.
On the one hand, investors may come to doubt the commitment to avoid inflation, since inflation would erode the real value of government debt. On the other hand, high public debt, in the absence of substantial inflation, eventually needs to be repaid, implying future surpluses and probably higher future taxes. Given that these taxes could be imposed on investment income earned in the United States — including interest and dividend payments on foreign owned United States assets — investors might at some point begin to demand an additional premium on United States assets.
Just how long the United States could continue to run fiscal deficits of their current size without a serious loss of confidence is a question we hope will not be answered.
On this issue, I side with the Aussies, especially as there is precious little sign that either President Bush or Congress are capable of significantly reducing the US federal deficit. In addition to the higher risk premium cited (which could trigger a Treasury bond sell-off), there is also the risk of a 'disorderly decline' of the US dollar in the coming year or two. Markets won't wait forever for politicians to sort things out. There may be less room to be sanguine than David H Levy and Stuart S Brown think.
UPDATE: Brad DeLong has a new post discussing the new paper by Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa, The U.S. Current Account and the Dollar. Both are well worth a look.
UPDATE 2: For those in London, Francesco Giavazzi from Bocconi University will be presenting this paper at the CEP/LSE International Economics Seminar on Wednesday 16 March 2005, 12:30 - 14:00 R405, CEP Conference Room, 4th Floor, Research Laboratory, entrance in 10 Portugal Street, London WC2A 2HD).
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